Vladislav Antonov
I can’t say that it’s THE WORST military defeat, but personally for my family - it is.
My great grand-father, just like all men at that time, was fighting against German invaders. He never returned from war, and there were no news or any documents about him. I decided to investigate the case to figure what happened to him.
After researching scanned archives, I was finally able to find some information about him. I figured that he was killed in November 1943 during failed offensive operation called “Orshanskaya offensive operation”. I became more curios and I decided to read more archive materials about this battle.

我不能說這是“最慘”的軍事失敗,但對我的家人來說,的確是。
我的曾祖父,就像當時所有的人一樣,在抗擊德國侵略者。他再也沒有從戰場上回來,也沒有關于他的任何消息或文件。我決定調查這個情況,弄清楚他到底怎么了。
在研究了掃描的檔案后,我終于找到了一些關于他的信息。我估計他是在1943年11月的一次失敗的名為“奧爾尚斯卡亞進攻行動”中犧牲的。我變得越來越好奇,我決定閱讀更多關于這場戰斗的檔案材料。


State Defence Committee of USSR - Comission Report M-715, 11-04-1944.
Quotes:

《1944年11月4日蘇聯國防委員會——M-715任務報告》節選:

“In the conducted operations, our artillery did not supress the enemy's artillery, despite the concentration in large quantities and superiority over the enemy. It did not happen neither during an artillery barrage, nor during the battle. Often artillery targeted an empty sectors, did not hear infantry requests, and lost communication with infantry units. As a result, even the friendly forces were barraged. Infantry was attacking the unsupressed enemy positions and as the result suffered huge losses and did not advance. The work of our artillery, especially in the counter artillery duel part, was insufficient during all the stages of combat engagement”
“Contrary to the instructions of the HQ, which prohibited the use of special units as ordinary infantry in battle, gen. Gordov often used reconnaissance, chemical and sappers units in ordinary infantry operations.”
Instead of careful artillery and operation planning, Gordov sought to penetrate the enemy’s defenses with manpower. This is evidenced by the losses suffered by the army. The total number of losses incurred by the 33rd Army, is more than 50% of the losses of the entire front.

“我軍炮兵在作戰中,盡管數量集中,而且比敵人有優勢,但沒有壓制住敵方的炮兵。無論是在炮擊中,還是在戰斗中,這都沒有發生。炮兵經常瞄準空區,聽不到步兵的請求,與步兵部隊失去聯系。結果,就連友軍也遭到炮轟。步兵進攻未被壓制的敵軍陣地,結果損失慘重,無法前進。我軍炮兵的工作,特別是對抗炮兵的工作,在交戰的各個階段都是不足的?!?br /> “與總部禁止特種部隊作為普通步兵在戰斗中使用的指示相反,戈多夫將軍在普通步兵作戰中經常使用偵察、化學、工兵部隊?!?br /> 戈多夫沒有進行周密的火炮和作戰計劃,而是設法用人力穿透敵人的防線。軍隊遭受的損失就是明證。第33軍的總損失超過了整個前線損失的50%。

WTF moment:
“In his order of September 4, 1943, addressed to the commander of the 173rd rifle division, Colonel Zaitsev and the commanders of the regiments, Lieutenant Colonel Milovanov, Lieutenant Colonel Sizov, Major Guslitzer, gen Gordov demanded:
“All officers should be put into battle formation “chain” and go through the forest to smoke machine gunners from their nests”

最佳無厘頭時刻:
“1943年9月4日,戈爾多夫將軍向173步槍師指揮官扎伊采夫上校和各團指揮官米洛瓦諾夫中校、西佐夫中校、古斯利策少校發出命令,要求:所有軍官都應該排成戰斗隊形“鏈”,穿過森林,把巢穴里的機槍手干掉?!?

On September 4, 1943, Gordov ordered Major General Ikonnikov, Chief of Staff of 70th regiment corps “Immediately send the entire command of the corps into the front-line. Leave in the headquarters only the chief of operations. "
Such inadmissible actions of Gordov led to disorganization of battle management and unreasonable losses in the officer corps. Over the past six months, in the 33rd Army, under the command of Gordov, 4 division commanders, 8 deputy division commanders and divisional chiefs, 38 regimental commanders and their deputies, and 174 battalion commanders were killed and wounded.
It gets only worse…

1943年9月4日,戈爾多夫命令第70兵團參謀長伊科尼科夫少將“立即把整個部隊都派到前線去。在總部只留下行動主官?!?br /> 戈爾多夫這種不可接受的行動,導致了戰斗管理的混亂和軍官團的不合理損失。近6個月來,第33軍在戈多夫指揮下,有4名師長、8名副師長、8名師部門主管、38名團長及副團長、174名營長傷亡。
情況甚至變得更糟糕……

“Major shortcomings occurred in the preparation and conduct of intelligence operations, and especially in the rear of the enemy. The main task — capturing captives — is not performed in many cases. So, in December, 23 reconnaissance operations were conducted in 192 platoon regiment to capture a POW. Not a single prisoner in these operations was captured, and the losses of our reconnaissance groups amounted to 26 people killed and wounded. In 192, 247 and 174 pr, hundreds of search reconnaissance operations were conducted from January 1 to February 15 and not a single prisoner was captured. In 331 and 251 pr, scouts were repeatedly killed in their minefields, since they were not indicated on map”

“情報行動的準備和實施存在重大缺陷,特別是在敵人后方。主要任務——抓俘虜——在很多情況下沒有執行。因此,12月份,192排進行了23次偵察行動來抓1名俘虜。結果一個都沒抓到,而我們偵察小組的損失達26人死傷。在192、247和174排的行動中,從1月1日到2月15日,進行了數百次搜查偵察行動,還是一個俘虜都沒抓到。在331和251排中,偵察兵多次在他們的雷區被炸死,因為地圖上沒有標出這些雷區?!?

“In the operation of the 33rd Army in the Vitebsk direction, on December 23, the entry of the tank corps into battle was planned after the capture of River Luchesa by the infantry (18 km deep defense). On this basis, tanks were not introduced into battle, and when the infantry was stopped by organized enemy fire from prearranged lines and the river continued to remain ahead, a tank corps, rushed into battle, lost 60 tanks and failed to succeed. In the operations on the Bogushevsky direction on January 8, the tank corps was brought into combat, when essentially the infantry had no success. Having suffered up to 70% of losses, the tank corps advanced 2-4 km with the infantry, and then was withdrawn from combat.”

“在第33軍在維捷布斯克方向的作戰中,12月23日,坦克兵團是在步兵占領盧切薩河(縱深18公里)后進入戰斗的。在此基礎上,坦克沒有投入戰斗,當步兵被敵軍有組織的火力從預先安排好的戰線上攔截下來,河流繼續保持在前方時,一個坦克兵團沖進戰場,損失了60輛坦克,沒有成功。當步兵被有組織的敵軍從預先安排好的戰線上的火力攔截,河流依舊擋在前面時,一支坦克部隊沖進戰場,損失了60輛坦克,未能突破防線。1月8日在博古舍夫斯基方向的作戰中,坦克部隊被投入戰斗,而步兵基本上沒有取得任何勝利。坦克部隊損失達70%,跟隨步兵前進2-4公里后退出戰斗?!?

Thus, the constant attempt of commanders to achieve a breakthrough in defense through the premature entry of the tank corps into a battle did not have any results, and led to the fact that only two tanks left in the tank corps”
“Our counter-battery and counter-mine-attack groups did not suppress the enemy’s artillery and mortars, as a result of which the advance of our infantry was hampered by the enemy’s strong artillery and mortar fire, which is evidenced by the fact that in some operations the percentage of shrapnel wounds reached 70-80%”
“Within 4 months, the chief of staff and the entire headquarters were located at a distance of about 100 kilometers from the location of the front command, and during this time the commander and chief of staff met no more than 3-4 times”

因此,指揮官們不斷試圖通過過早地讓坦克部隊進入戰斗來實現防御上的突破,但沒有任何效果,導致坦克部隊只剩下兩輛坦克。
“我們的反炮兵連和反地雷攻擊小組沒有壓制敵人的火炮和迫擊炮,因此,我們步兵的推進受到敵人強大炮火和迫擊炮火力的阻擋,事實證明,在某些行動中,彈片傷占70-80%?!?br /> “在4個月內,參謀長和整個總部被安置在距離前線司令部約100公里的地方,在此期間,前線指揮官和參謀長會面不超過3-4次?!?br>原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.cqxyscyz.com 轉載請注明出處


HQ instructions prohibited the use of reconnaissance units as regular infantry in combat. This order was systematically violated on the Western Front. Thus, in January 1944, in 33 armies, all reconnaissance units and formations that participated in the offensive as linear units and were completely destroyed.
Results of offensive operation:
Over 26 thousands killed, and 78 thousands wounded. Offensive operation was stopped and Germans were able to retain their positions (while having 3 times less manpower and about 5 times less in artillery and tank power).
Incredible and outrageous incompetence of leadership. No wonder why my great-grand father died there.

司令部的指示禁止在戰斗中使用偵察部隊作為常規步兵。這一命令在西線遭到有系統地違反。因此,1944年1月,在33支軍隊中,所有作為直線部隊參加進攻的偵察部隊和編隊都被徹底摧毀。
攻擊行動的結果:
超過2.6萬人死亡,7.8萬人受傷。進攻行動被停止,德國人得以保留陣地(而兵力只有蘇軍三分之一,大炮和坦克數量只有蘇軍五分之一)。
令人難以置信的無能領導。難怪我的曾祖父死在那里。